India’s Antitrust Regulator CCI Fines Intel US$3.01 Million for Abuse of Dominant Position

Posted by Written by Archana Rao Reading Time: 5 minutes

India’s Competition Commission (CCI) fined Intel Corporation US$3.01 million for abusing its dominant position via an India-specific warranty policy that restricted parallel imports.

The order highlights growing antitrust scrutiny of localized commercial practices and key compliance risks for tech companies and multinational enterprises operating in India.


On February 12, 2026, India’s antitrust authority, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), imposed a penalty of INR 273.8 million (US$3.01 million) on Intel Corporation for abusing its dominant position through an India-specific warranty policy applicable to boxed microprocessors.

The penalty was levied on the multinational tech-company over its India-specific warranty framework for boxed microprocessors, which was in force from 2016 until 2024. Under this policy, warranty services were available only for products purchased through authorized Indian distributors, effectively disadvantaging consumers and parallel importers. CCI found this approach inconsistent with Intel’s warranty practices in markets such as China and Australia, as well as other jurisdictions.

Background of the case

The proceedings against Intel Corp. arose from an information filed by Matrix Info Systems Private Limited under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002. The informant alleged that, effective April 25, 2016, Intel revised its warranty terms in India. Under the revised policy, warranty claims for Intel’s boxed microprocessors (BMPs) were accepted only if the products had been purchased from an authorized distributor within India.

Consequently, products procured from Intel’s authorized distributors outside India, even if genuine, were not serviced domestically. Customers were instead directed to seek warranty support in the country of purchase. This approach effectively restricted parallel imports into India.

India’s antitrust regulator’s findings

In its February 2026 order, issued under Section 27 of the CCI Act, the antitrust authority determined that Intel held a dominant position in the relevant market for boxed microprocessors for desktops in India.

The Commission concluded that the India-specific warranty policy was discriminatory, particularly when compared with Intel’s warranty practices in jurisdictions such as China and Australia, as well as other global markets. The policy was found to limit consumer choice and restrict parallel importers, resulting in an appreciable adverse effect on competition and harm to Indian consumers.

Accordingly, the CCI held that Intel’s conduct violated Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, which prohibits abuse of dominant position.

Under Chapter 2 of the CCI Act, 2002, Section 4, Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Position, bars any enterprise or group from misusing its dominant market power in a manner that harms competition or consumers. Even though holding a dominant position in a market is not unlawful by itself, the Act specifically targets conduct that exploits that position to the detriment of competitors or consumers.

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Monetary fine and directions by CCI

Taking into account that the policy had been in force for approximately eight years, the CCI initially computed the penalty at 8 percent of Intel’s average relevant turnover. However, after considering mitigating circumstances, including Intel’s withdrawal of the policy effective April 1, 2024, the CCI reduced the final penalty to INR 273.8 million (US$3.01 million).

In addition to the monetary penalty, Intel has been directed to widely publicize the withdrawal of the impugned warranty policy and submit a compliance report to the Commission.

Regulatory FAQs foreign companies must know

1. When can the CCI initiate an inquiry?

Under Section 19 of the CCI Act, 2002, the authority can investigate:

  • Anti-competitive agreements (Section 3), or
  • Abuse of dominant position (Section 4).

The CCI can begin an inquiry in three ways:

  1. The authority can act on its own (suo motu) knowledge or observation
  2. On receiving information from any person, consumer, trade association, or consumer association (with the prescribed fee), or
  3. On a reference from the central government, state government, or a statutory authority.

2. How does the CCI decide if an agreement harms the competition framework?

When examining whether an agreement negatively affects competition, the CCI looks at factors such as the following:

  • Whether it creates barriers for new businesses to enter the market
  • Whether it forces existing competitors out
  • Whether it blocks or restricts competition
  • Whether consumers benefit
  • Whether it improves production, distribution, or services
  • Whether it promotes technological or economic development

3. How does the CCI determine if a company is “dominant”?

To assess whether a company holds a dominant position, the CCI evaluates its position on the basis of its market share, financial strength, the size and strength of its competitors, and the economic power or commercial advantages. There are other factors such as:

  • Vertical integration or distribution network
  • Consumer dependence on the company
  • Entry barriers (e.g., regulatory hurdles, high capital costs, economies of scale)
  • Market structure and size
  • Buying power of customers
  • Any other relevant factor

4. What is a “relevant market”?

Before assigning dominance status to a company, the CCI must define the relevant market, which has two parts.

(a) Relevant geographic market

This considers the geographic area where competition conditions are similar. Factors include:

  • Trade barriers
  • Transport costs
  • Distribution facilities
  • Consumer preferences
  • Language
  • Need for after-sales services

(b) Relevant product market

This focuses on which products or services compete with each other. Factors include:

  • Physical features or end-use
  • Price
  • Consumer preferences
  • Whether there are specialised producers
  • Industrial classification

5. What can the CCI do after finding a violation?

If, after conducting an inquiry, the CCI concludes that an agreement violates Section 3 (anti-competitive agreements) or a company has abused its dominant position under Section 4, it can issue one or more corrective orders.

1. Order to stop the conduct: The CCI can direct the company (or association of companies/persons) to:

  • Immediately stop the illegal agreement, or
  • Stop abusing its dominant position, and
  • Not enter into or repeat such conduct in the future.

This is known as a cease-and-desist order.

2. Impose financial penalties: The Commission can levy monetary penalties. General violations can lead to up to 10 percent of the average turnover of the last three financial years for each company involved.

If the violation involves a cartel, the CCI can impose a higher penalty of up to three times the profit made for each year of the cartel’s operation, or 10 percent of turnover for each year of the cartel’s operation, whichever is higher.

Cartel penalties are intentionally more severe because cartel conduct is considered particularly harmful to competition.

3. Modify agreements: The CCI can direct that the problematic agreement be changed in a specific manner instead of completely voiding it.

4. Issue additional directions: The Commission may order compliance measures, direct payment of costs, or issue any other order it considers appropriate to remedy the violation.

5. Liability of group companies: If the violating company is part of a corporate group, and other group entities contributed to or were responsible for the violation, the CCI can also pass orders against those group members.

Competition law risk management for foreign MNEs in India

The CCI found that Intel’s India-specific warranty policy for boxed microprocessors limited consumer choice and restricted parallel imports. The outcome carries important compliance implications for multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in India. The order underscores that:

  • Dominant enterprises must avoid discriminatory or exclusionary commercial practices.
  • Local policy deviations can trigger scrutiny if they distort competition in the defined relevant market.
  • After-sales restrictions may form part of competition analysis.

Key risk areas for multinationals

Localized commercial policies

India-specific pricing, warranty, or distribution frameworks must be assessed through a competition law lens where market power exists. Policies that restrict sourcing channels or differentiate treatment across jurisdictions may be examined for discriminatory effects.

After-sales and distribution controls

Warranty recognition, service limitations, or channel exclusivity can influence market access. If a company holds substantial market power, such service restrictions may be viewed as foreclosure or denial of market access.

Group-level exposure

Liability may extend beyond the operating subsidiary to other group entities if they contributed to or were responsible for the impugned conduct.

Practical compliance measures for foreign firms

  1. Conduct market power reviews: Periodically assess whether the company holds dominance in specific Indian product segments, considering market share, entry barriers, and consumer dependence.
  2. Audit India-specific policies: Review warranty terms, distribution models, pricing frameworks, and bundling arrangements for potential exclusionary or discriminatory impact.
  3. Document objective justifications: Where differentiated commercial practices are adopted, maintain clear economic rationale and pro-competitive justification.
  4. Strengthen internal governance: Ensure company senior management and commercial teams in India are trained on abuse of dominance risks, particularly regarding unilateral conduct.
  5. Prepare for regulatory scrutiny: Establish internal protocols for responding to competition investigations, including document management and regulatory engagement procedures.

Executive takeaway

Market dominance itself is lawful; its misuse is not. India-specific commercial strategies require competition law assessment. Warranty and distribution restrictions can trigger abuse scrutiny. Governance and documentation are critical risk mitigants.

Proactive competition compliance should be integrated into policy design and market strategy for MNEs in India.

(US$1 = INR 90.7)

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